Jamie Shea is NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges. He has been working with NATO since 1980. Positions included Director of Policy Planning in the Private Office of the Secretary General, Deputy Assistant Secretary General for External Relations, Public Diplomacy Division, Director of Information and Press, Spokesman of NATO and Deputy Director of Information and Press, Deputy Head and Senior Planning Officer at the Policy Planning and Multilateral Affairs Section of the Political Directorate as well as Assistant to the Secretary General of NATO for Special Projects.

Jamie Shea is involved with several prominent academic institutions and acts amongst others as professor of the Collège d’Europe, Bruges, Visiting Lecturer in the Practice of Diplomacy, University of Sussex, Associate Professor of International Relations at the American University, Washington DC, where he also holds the position of Director of the Brussels Overseas Study Programme, and lectures at the Brussels School of International Studies at the University of Kent. He also is a regular lecturer and conference speaker on NATO and European security affairs and on public diplomacy and political communication and lobbying. He holds a D.Phil. in Modern History from Oxford University (Lincoln College), 1981.

Amongst his many associations and memberships, Jamie Shea is Member of the Advisory Board, Security and Defence Programmes at Chatham House, Member of the Policy Council at the World Economic Forum in Geneva and Founder and Member of the Board, Security and Defence Agenda Brussels.

Jamie Shea’s 10 from 10

  • Over the last few years the CSDP has focused largely on Africa.  This makes sense to me as the CSDP should be aligned with Europe’s key security interests rather than spread itself all over the world. It should aim not to just succeed in individual missions, but to stabilize whole regions.
  • Regional stabilization will mean more coherence and closer links between the individual CSDP missions; for instance those dealing with crisis management and those dealing with longer term training, capacity building and security sector reform.  The need for coherence also applies to the connection between missions on shore and missions at sea, for instance in the current Atalanta operation in the Gulf of Aden.
  • To enhance CSDP, the EU  needs a process to start planning earlier and decide on missions more rapidly.  A solidarity fund may also help to launch missions faster by using more common funding to offset the costs incurred by deploying EU nations.  This could be one of the results of the EU Summit on Defence in December 2013.
  • The advantage of the CSDP is that it is able to embody the comprehensive approach where the civilian and military components of a mission are planned at the same time and deployed together.  This said, it is still easier to deploy military forces than to mobilize civilian assets, which have other roles in EU societies.  Therefore, particular attention will need to be paid to having readily available civilian experts to deploy.
  • At a time of financial austerity, it makes sense to have greater synergy between NATO and the EU.  This could apply to lessons learned from EU and NATO operations, as well as coming together for exercises, for instance between the EU Battle Groups and the NATO Response Force.  A common system of certification for military equipment or a single European skies arrangement would certainly help to save money and also promote NATO-EU interoperability.
  • To promote regular cooperation between NATO and the EU, it will also be useful if the two institutions could undertake operations in the same places, even if they play different roles.  This has been the case in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan in the past and would also be a model for dealing with security sector reform in Libya in the future.
  • Part of bringing NATO and CSDP closer is that NATO should continue to reach out to the EU non-NATO countries, such as Sweden and Finland, which have been actively engaged in NATO’s operations in the past, while the EU makes a similar effort to reach out to those countries which are NATO members but not in the EU, for instance Turkey or Norway.  This will ensure that we make the best use of the skills and contributions of all the members of the transatlantic community, and that we promote interoperability and a common strategic culture.
  • As the CSDP now embraces a military dimension, the question of capabilities becomes ever more important.  As a former NATO Secretary General once put it, “you can’t send an organizational chart into a crisis”.  At a time when the United States is pivoting to Asia and expecting Europe to take more responsibility for security in its immediate neighbourhood, Europeans need to carry out an audit of their military capabilities to determine where they are duplicating each other and what the gaps are that need to be urgently filled if the Europeans are to have a full spectrum of capabilities to undertake missions beyond training and security sector reform.  A recent European Parliament study estimates that the total cost of duplication in European defence is at least €26 billion per year.
  • Improving European defence capabilities will require some difficult but unavoidable choices about the degree of defence integration versus the degree of national autonomy and independence.  Europeans will only be able to develop common capabilities if they are able to trust each other and act together in crisis situations.
  • European defence budgets have decreased by 15% on average since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007.  These cuts are not likely to be overturned in the future, even if the European economies pick up.  Therefore, improving European defence capabilities will require greater synergy between the EU and NATO, especially in avoiding duplication between NATO’s Smart Defence and the EU’s Pooling and Sharing.  Both organizations will need to work in a way that facilitates the objectives of the other.  The goal is to promote European capacity for crisis management and capacity-building, while keeping the US and Canada firmly rooted in European defence for deterrence and to  respond to the possible re-emergence of major threats in the future.